THE CONTEXT, CAUSES, AND CULTURAL VALUATION OF
YORUBA AND BAGANDA WOMEN’S PARTICIPATION
IN THE PUBLIC ECONOMY

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Abstract

This paper examines participation in the public economy among two groups of African women, the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria and the Baganda of central Uganda, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The analysis considers many kinds of economic activity other than growing food for one’s own family, including independent income-generating work and salaried or waged employment. For the Yoruba, discussion focuses on the period between around 1820 and 1960, by which point the major features of women’s roles for the rest of the century were already in place. For the Baganda, however, we concentrate on the decades after 1970, for it was only then that many women entered work outside the home. This comparative account argues that the patterns of women’s economic engagement were shaped by the interplay of three factors: the demands and opportunities presented by the context within which they lived; the specific reasons that led individual women to enter the public economy; and how their culture assessed their roles.
A. INTRODUCTION

This paper examines participation in the public economy among two groups of African women, the Yoruba of southwestern Nigeria and the Baganda of central Uganda, during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The analysis considers many kinds of economic activity other than growing food for one’s own family, including independent income-generating work and salaried or waged employment. For the Yoruba, discussion focuses on the period between around 1820 and 1960, by which point the major features of women’s roles for the rest of the century were already in place. For the Baganda, however, we concentrate on the decades after 1970, for it was only then that many women entered work outside the home.

This comparison suggests that the patterns of women’s economic engagement were shaped by the interplay of three factors: the demands and opportunities presented by the context within which they lived; the specific reasons that led individual women to enter the public economy; and how their culture assessed their roles. To explore these interactions, the study first considers the settings within which the two sets of women engaged in the extra-domestic economy. Political, demographic, social, economic, and religious factors provided the background to women’s work and determined the sorts of opportunities available to them. We turn then to the kinds of income-generating activities in which women were engaged, together with the motives that led them to undertake such work and the cultural factors that affected how it was perceived by contemporaries. Although most African societies expected women to feed their families, we ask what considerations led some women to leave direct production of food in their own or other people’s fields in favor of working to earn money and then using their income to buy food. Their motives may be situated along a spectrum that extended from strong “push”
forces at one end (an urgent need to earn some money simply to keep one’s family alive) to strong “pull” forces at the other (such as a desire to provide better opportunities for one’s children, to engage interesting or sociable work outside the home, or to contribute to the good of the community). We ask also whether a woman who earned her own money was respected by her husband and other members of the community for the income she brought into the family and whether her economic roles were buttressed by additional forms of public participation. Or did her society define a good woman’s roles as confined to her home and family, so that anyone who worked elsewhere was viewed as inappropriately independent, ambitious, or sexually immoral?

These two ethnic groups were chosen for a juxtapositional comparison because they present markedly different histories of women’s work, despite sharing certain features.\(^1\) Both Yorubaland (a term I use to denote the area inhabited largely by Yoruba-speaking peoples, though it was not a single unit politically) and Buganda lie in the broad equatorial belt of sub-Saharan Africa, and both became British colonies.\(^2\) They were brought into the global economy as producers of cash crops and as potential customers of British manufactured goods. Neither had a sizeable white settler population or many foreign-owned plantations, and neither had much mining. Traditional religions and cultural patterns in both places were disrupted during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries by the introduction of Islam, Christianity, and western

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\(^2\) As used here, “Yorubaland” refers to the Crown Colony of Lagos and most of the colonial Western Region. My account pertains to the western and central parts of the area; somewhat different patterns were found in eastern Yorubaland, especially in the nineteenth century (Marjorie Keniston McIntosh, *Yoruba Women, Work, and Social Change* [Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2009; African edition, Ibadan: Bookcraft, 2010], 7-11). Written evidence becomes available around 1820, and a sense of shared Yoruba identity began to appear after around 1850. By “Buganda” I mean the geographic area occupied primarily by Luganda-speaking people, not the official kingdom, though they were generally synonymous.
education. In both cultures, the primary identity of women came through their roles within the family.

Despite those similarities, Yorubaland and Buganda differed in many respects. Yoruba women were part of a society marked by active trade and many cultural contacts along the Atlantic seaboard. Their economic activities thus provide an example of patterns observed among other urbanized coastal women whose contributions have been documented in West, East, and South Africa. The Baganda inhabited a land-locked area with little long-distance trade and far more restricted roles for women. Their work experiences are probably similar to those found in many other societies in the interior of the continent, groups that have received relatively little historical attention.

This project secondarily offers a good vantage-point for considering several questions currently under debate among colonial and imperial historians. Recent work on empire has moved far beyond the earlier—though often implicit—assumption that what mattered in colonial history was how foreigners and their beliefs and institutions imposed themselves on natives. Scholars now acknowledge that all interactions between cultures involved two-way and reciprocal negotiations between local people and outsiders. Patterns of belief and behavior present in indigenous societies responded to but also modified external forces. Moreover, those foreign influences did not assume a single, monolithic form in all settings, even if they were brought by the same European nation. Nor did all the emissaries of a given country perceive and deal with local people in the same way: government officials, missionaries, and merchants

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might have very different interests. A sub-field that is receiving considerable attention addresses women, gender, and sexualities within imperial contexts. While scholars are now turning away from an approach that explores how local women were affected or acted upon in colonial settings, the question of how African women acquired and utilized agency within the spaces created by the intersection of local patterns and outside forces needs further investigation.

My study adds force to the argument that British colonial officials had to function under widely differing local conditions, making it almost impossible to apply consistent policies throughout even the African parts of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century empire. It illustrates also the kinds of disagreements that could arise between various British representatives in the colonies. Finally, the paper emphasizes that interactions between the British and African women were by no means uni-directional. Some groups of women were able to carve out new opportunities for themselves by combining familiar patterns with imported institutions and ideas. Their ability to do so rested upon several factors: their society’s attitudes towards change and authority, their creativity in creating new niches or innovative syntheses within an altered context, and their effectiveness in forcing local male leaders and British administrators to respond to their concerns.

The analysis offered here relies upon diverse sources. My description of Yoruba women is based upon the many secondary studies written by Yoruba and foreign scholars joined by my

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6 Even the finest scholars display some tendency to regard women as recipients of change. Philippa Levine recently commented: “Historians investigating the lives of colonial women thus look simultaneously at the impact of colonization and at customs and laws that predate colonialism, investigating how the former has shaped and changed the latter, and how this might have affected the lives of women” (in her “Preface” to Gender and Empire, vii).
own research in newspapers, colonial materials in London, and the exceptionally rich primary sources in Nigeria itself. The most helpful were the local court records of the colonial period, which had been taken to a back room in the basement of the library of a university founded in the 1960s and then largely forgotten. That research is laid out more fully in my book, *Yoruba Women, Work, and Social Change*, which covers the period 1820 to 1960. The account of Buganda and its women draws upon the research that Professor Grace Bantebya Kyomuhendo and I did in 2002-3 while I was teaching in the Department of Women and Gender Studies at Makerere University in Kampala. Our sources included written materials, preserved in Uganda and Britain, as well as interviews with 125 women: some national leaders but mostly local women from seven regions of Uganda. Our findings are described in our co-authored book, *Women, Work, and Domestic Virtue in Uganda, 1900-2003*. Because much of the information summarized in this paper, though not its comparative analysis, is documented in full notes in those two books, references will be provided here only to specific quantitative statements and additional material.

The discussion begins by summarizing the context within which women’s activities occurred. Moving from the nineteenth through the twentieth centuries, we compare the two groups by topic, highlighting the differences between them. The rest of the paper looks at women’s work, its causes, and the cultural factors that determined how it was valued.

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7 See note 2 above.
B. CONTRASTING CONTEXTS FOR WOMEN’S WORK

1. THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

Yorubaland was divided into many smaller kingdoms and some states dominated by warrior chiefs after the breakup of the great Oyo Empire early in the nineteenth century. Although the amount of power held by rulers varied between the Yoruba states, they were in all cases required to consult with representatives of the community, including women. Some chieftaincies were hereditary, but most chiefs were appointed on the basis of their contributions to the community. The Yoruba had been in contact with European traders along the coast since the seventeenth century, but direct British political involvement began with the bombardment of Lagos, the major slaving port, in 1851 and subsequent takeover of that island. Over the next 40 years the British gradually extended their control over the rest of Yorubaland, through a combination of military force and negotiation. After around 1893, the area was brought within a formal colonial structure.

The interior region of East Africa that was to become Uganda contained four major hierarchal kingdoms—of which Buganda became the most important—and many smaller, acephalous communities in the nineteenth century. While the bulk of Buganda’s population consisted of commoners or peasants, it also had a hereditary monarchy, chiefs and their privileged families, an official whom the British termed a Prime Minister, and a regular meeting of chiefs that the British termed a Parliament. The Buganda kingdom had for several centuries been expanding through military conquest beyond its original home along the northwestern shore of Lake Victoria. The power of Buganda’s kings and chiefs—and the number of dependents
they controlled—increased during the nineteenth century, at the expense of authority formerly held by the clans. Not until the 1860s and 1870s did the first British explorers and political emissaries reach Uganda. Britain declared Uganda a protectorate in 1894, but it began active colonial control only after 1900, when it signed agreements with Buganda and the other kingdoms.

In demographic terms, Yorubaland’s population was seriously disrupted during the nineteenth century by three main factors. Hundreds of thousands of people moved southwards during the first third of the century to escape the violence caused by the disintegration of the old Oyo Empire. A long series of civil wars between the various Yoruba successor states caused further movement of people and changes in family patterns due to the constant threat of violence. Especially damaging was slaving. Recent estimates suggest that nearly a million Yoruba were captured and exported to the Western Hemisphere between 1651 and 1867; between 1800 and 1850 alone, about 470,000 Yoruba slaves were taken. The remaining population of the Yoruba area in 1906 was somewhere around three million, suggesting that a substantial minority of the community had been forcibly removed. Moreover, most of the people taken as slaves were younger adults and older children, magnifying the reproductive consequences of their absence. With the ending of the trans-Atlantic slave trade in the later 1860s, it was to a large extent replaced by the growing demand for slaves within Yorubaland itself. In indigenous or domestic slavery, unfree laborers—especially women and children—were used within local households and fields, living in the household of their masters. (As was true also in Buganda, Christian missionaries were passionate about ending the capture and export of slaves to foreigners but ambivalent about whether indigenous slavery should be tolerated.) The demographic impact of indigenous slavery was, however, less severe. Violence had secondary consequences as well.
The gender imbalance among the Yoruba caused by the death of soldiers in the civil war led some widows to maintain their own households, though the need for personal protection contributed conversely to a rise in polygyny. Physical danger brought an increase in urbanization and fortified towns.

In Buganda, the kingdom’s ongoing territorial expansion and its frequent military conflicts with other groups, especially the Banyoro, caused local but usually only temporary instability for the overwhelmingly agricultural population. Although relatively few slaves were sold to traders from the Indian Ocean coast until the late nineteenth century, indigenous slavery became more common.\(^9\) Resulting to some extent from an abundant stock of prisoners of war, the presence of largely foreign slaves within Buganda was part of a growing effort by powerful men to control labor and demonstrate status through having many dependents. The only major population crisis occurred in the years around 1900, when an epidemic of rinderpest among cattle was followed by an outbreak of Sleeping Sickness among people living along the shores of the region’s lakes. The destabilization caused by that epidemic probably made it easier for the British to establish political control.

Urbanization was another area of contrast. Western Yorubaland was heavily urbanized during the nineteenth century, due not only to the need for physical security but also because of the economic and social advantages that urban communities increasingly offered. Even families whose major support came from farming commonly lived in some kind of a defensible town, from which they went out to work in their fields. Six Yoruba cities were said by travelers in the

second half of the nineteenth century to have populations of over 40,000 people, and another 16 towns had between 10,000 and 40,000 people.\textsuperscript{10}

There was nothing like that in Buganda, which remained almost entirely rural throughout the nineteenth century. Virtually all families were engaged in subsistence agriculture, with an emphasis on growing crops, sometimes supplemented by cattle raising. Until the mid- or even later nineteenth century, Buganda contained no permanent communities that a geographer would recognize as towns. The handful of settlements that had more than around 500 inhabitants lay next to the palaces of the king and leading chiefs, who moved from place to place every few years. By the end of the century, however, the population of Kampala, Buganda’s capital, which centered on the royal compound, had become somewhat larger and more fixed.\textsuperscript{11}

In terms of social structure, the Yoruba were divided into lineages and segments. Extended family compounds, which might include as many as several hundred people normally headed by a senior male, were centers of biological and domestic reproduction; they were also the locus for production of pre-processed food stuffs and craft items for sale. Baganda society was divided into clans, which had their own farming lands and ceremonial centers. Clans were composed of family units, each consisting of a man, his wife or wives, and their children, with each family living in its own separate household. The dwelling and outbuildings of a given family usually lay close to its allocation of fields. Homes were sometimes grouped into villages, but many were dispersed in the countryside, with no near neighbors.

Craft production in nineteenth-century Yorubaland was specialized and vigorous. Both men and women wore clothing made of locally-woven and dyed textiles, and cloth and pottery were exported. In Buganda, many people made simple items for their own household’s use, but

few people engaged in skilled craftwork. None of Uganda’s cultures wove, dyed, or used textiles, and iron weapons and tools were generally obtained from other ethnic groups in the region. The manufacture of bark cloth, worn on ceremonial occasions and made by men, was one of the only specialized crafts in Buganda.

Patterns of commerce varied greatly between the two places. In western Yorubaland, active trade at local, regional, and long-distance levels was increasingly directed toward the Atlantic ports and production for an international capitalist economy. Even in the first half of the nineteenth century, all towns had markets, held daily or every few days, and huge caravans followed well established trade routes across Yorubaland. People and goods (carried normally on the heads of porters or slaves) moved northward to the Sahara, southward to the Atlantic, and east- and westward to other forest and savannah areas in West Africa. Cowry shells were used as the unit of exchange throughout the area. Agricultural production for the market increased during the second half of the nineteenth century as the British attempted to replace slaving with “legitimate commerce” in the form of export items like palm products and cocoa. In most Yoruba areas, as in Buganda, draft animals could not be used, due to the presence of diseases, so all farming was done by human labor. But because the Yoruba had no tradition whereby a free person worked for another in return for pay, indigenous slavery was the main source of additional labor. People who controlled large compounds filled with relatives, dependents, and free followers as well as slaves gained productive and commercial capacity as well as displaying their prominence.

Trade was quite different in Buganda. This area was located more than 400 miles from the Indian Ocean, and it contained a weakly developed system of commerce in the first half of the nineteenth century. A little local trade in food and craft items took place, but there were few
regular markets. Some exchanges occurred between regions of the Great Lakes area, usually involving iron wares or salt in return for bark cloth. No currency was used: all trade was done by barter. Only after 1850 did regular long-distance trade with the Indian Ocean develop, controlled by Arabs or South Asians. It focused initially on ivory and later on guns, ammunition, and—to a lesser extent—slaves. By the end of the century, cowries and rupees were coming into use, and some of the kings and chiefs had begun to establish markets and collect tolls.

The religious histories of the two regions likewise invite comparison. In Yorubaland, Islam spread southwards during the first half of the nineteenth century, fostered by the Fulani revolt and movement of Muslims down into the southern forest belt and Lagos. Most of the first group of Christian missionaries, who began to arrive in the 1830s and 1840s, were Africans, many of them Yoruba, either freed slaves who had been converted and educated in Sierra Leone or people who had been slaves in Brazil but later returned to their homeland. Conversion was backed by the Church Missionary Society (CMS), the evangelical wing of the (Protestant) Church of England, which was eager to establish a native African church, and some of the early missionaries attempted to accommodate Christian beliefs to traditional practices. Because missionaries in Yorubaland were frequently unable to convert local leaders, tension developed in some areas between the older elite and those people who had acquired status and a Western education through their connection to the new faith. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, more white missionaries were working in Yorubaland. This led to an increasingly European definition of Christianity by the CMS, hesitation about having African men in leadership positions, and the founding of independent, breakaway African denominations that combined some indigenous religious and social practices, including polygyny, with Christian beliefs. Although Yorubaland was thus severely disrupted during the nineteenth century, people
were able to adapt in part because their world view taught that change was a necessary part of life. Over many generations the Yoruba had learned how to hold on to those traditions they valued while at the same time adjusting to new circumstances and seeking new opportunities.

Uganda’s religious history was quite different. Islam began to spread only in the second half of the nineteenth century, carried by traders from the coast. The first Christian missionaries to arrive, in 1877, came from the CMS, followed by Roman Catholic missionaries from France, Italy, and Britain. The missionaries, especially those from the CMS, adopted the strategy of converting the area’s traditional leaders first. The rapid acceptance of Christianity by members of royal and noble families ensured that the new religion would be seen as a high-status belief. Although Islam and the various Christian denominations fought bitterly with each other for political power and converts during the 1880s and 1890s, by the end of the century the CMS had won out over Catholics and even more so over Muslims, at least at higher levels of society. This is illustrated by the religious affiliation of Buganda’s 112 chiefs in 1900. Conversion efforts had been underway for only one generation, but 62 of those chiefs had accepted Protestantism, 44 were Roman Catholics, and 6 were Muslims. None professed public loyalty to customary Baganda religious beliefs and practices.\(^{12}\) For the Buganda, accustomed to the top-down authority of their kings and chiefs, there was little pressure for independent resistance or accommodation to change.

2. THE COLONIAL PERIOD

During the colonial years, many aspects of life continued to differ between the two cultures. I will note just a few aspects of the colonial period that were of particular importance for western Yoruba and Baganda women. The level of urbanization was strikingly dissimilar. In Yorubaland, as the population recovered from the disasters of the nineteenth century, towns and cities continued to grow. In 1931, the area contained nearly 4 million people, with 387,000 in Lagos, 126,000 in Ibadan, and 22,000 or more in ten other towns.¹³ Yorubaland in the 1930s was more heavily urbanized than France, Sweden, and Canada, though below Great Britain, Germany, and the United States. By 1952-3, when the population was nearly 5 million, twelve towns had populations of more than 40,000 people, and dozens of others contained 10,000-40,000 people. At the time of Nigeria’s Independence in 1960, huge Yoruba cities were struggling with the problems of ongoing immigration despite inadequate infrastructure and services. In Uganda, although there was a little migration into towns as the colonial era progressed, the country remained overwhelmingly rural. In 1959, when the total population was around 6.5 million, Kampala was the only community that had more than 40,000 residents; four other towns had more than 10,000 residents.

The degree and nature of commerce during the colonial era likewise varied between the two areas. Yorubaland assumed a more important place in the international economy as a producer of agricultural raw materials and a consumer of manufactured imports. The government worked with farmers, especially to increase the amount of cocoa raised and sold, and

after World War II created Marketing Boards to set prices and appoint buying agents. Although foreign merchant companies and banks took control of upper levels of commerce and credit, they commonly named local representatives. Greater physical security and improved internal transportation systems, both roads and railways, facilitated the expansion of trade. In Uganda, trade began to grow after 1900, especially through the production of cotton, tea, and coffee, but upper levels of the commercial system were dominated by resident foreigners. South Asian immigrants, who were given preferential treatment by the British, had a virtual monopoly over wholesaling and shop keeping. A few African men worked for South Asians or sold in small local markets.

In the area of religion, traditional beliefs retained their power in some Yoruba regions right through the colonial period, while among Christians the enormously popular independent or syncretic churches continued to expand. In Buganda, though missionary reports indicate that Christianity spread fairly slowly among common people during the first half of the twentieth century, by the end of the colonial period one sees little evidence of ongoing loyalty to traditional religions. Nor did Ugandans set up alternative Christian churches. Until the arrival of “born-again” foreign missionaries, mainly from North America, in the late twentieth century, virtually all Ugandan Christians were members of one of the two mainstream churches: the Protestant Church of Uganda, or the Roman Catholic Church.

British Protestant leaders in Uganda during the colonial period provide an interesting illustration of the lack of uniformity in the attitudes of British emissaries overseas. Early Protestant bishops protested vehemently to Ugandan colonial authorities over what they claimed were violations of the initial agreements with the kingdoms in 1900. They also displayed surprising sensitivity concerning issues important to African women. In the 1920s missionaries
and church officials objected so strongly to some of the marriage policies of the colonial government that Bishop John Willis of the Church of Uganda was reproved by the Law Office of the British Crown. Writing to his clergy in the 1930s, Bishop Willis highlighted the problems that could occur when a man who had multiple wives through traditional marriages accepted Christianity and was henceforth allowed to keep only one of them. He expressed sympathy for women caught in difficult marriages and defended the baptism of illegitimate children and of female converts regardless of their husband’s religious position. In 1931, Willis defended the right of Christian women to press both Buganda leaders and colonial officials about rules concerning inheritance and children. He argued with a British administrator who claimed that “the country was in no way ready for women to take such a part in framing the policy of the country.”

Bishop S. C. E. Stuart, active in the 1940s and early 1950s, clashed repeatedly with colonial officials over the low level of government support for teacher training and was ultimately forced to offer a formal apology. His wife Mary championed the cause of better working conditions and housing for female African servants, disputing the claims of colonial officers, and fought successfully for the admission of the first women students to Makerere University in 1945.

Whereas differences between Yorubaland and Buganda remained profound, the political and legal changes introduced by colonialism brought certain similarities to the experiences of their women. In both places, the British system of indirect rule gave greater and often unfamiliar authority to kings and chiefs, thereby weakening the importance of the people who had previously advised them, including women. In western Yoruba cities, market women and female craft workers organized massive protests, shutting down commerce, in response to taxation,

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whether imposed by the colonial government or by local rulers supported by the British. Educated, urban Yoruba women formed new associations that took a public stand on social and political issues. In Abeokuta in 1947-8, a union of market women and members of the female elite organized a series of sit-ins in the royal compound, lasting for days at a time, that forced the king first to accept a series of political and economic reforms and then to go into exile. In Buganda, women rarely engaged in political matters, and when they did so, it was initially about issues of inheritance or to support Baganda nationalism. During the late colonial period, however, some broader organizations formed, involving educated women from many backgrounds; they had limited impact in protecting women’s rights. As pressure for independence mounted in both Nigeria and Uganda during the 1940s and 1950s, women were not elected to national Legislative Councils in either country, nor did they hold significant leadership positions in the western-style political parties that developed in the 1950s. Issues of particular concern to women were rarely at the center of the parties’ policy statements. These developments meant that when independence came, women were largely excluded from power, except as voters. The lack of female participation in post-colonial governments was surely a loss for both countries.

The British presence was not, however, uniformly harmful for women. Certain colonial laws served to increase their personal and economic independence, albeit most of those consequences were unforeseen and probably undesired by British officials. The export of slaves was gradually ended by the British, who also abolished indigenous slavery early in the twentieth century, a change of greater benefit to women than men. Colonial legislation introduced what was in effect private property which—unlike family land—could be bought and sold by individuals. Although women were eligible to own property, they were less likely in both
settings to do so than men. By the late colonial years, however, Yoruba women were buying private property, usually to grow crops for market sale or to build urban rooming houses that would produce rent. Similar options were utilized by relatively few women in Buganda after the 1910s and 1920s, when the chiefs decided that women should not be allowed to have their own cotton fields.

Of great significance in Yorubaland was the creation in 1884 and 1907 of formal procedures for legally recognized divorce. During the rest of the colonial period, more than a hundred thousand Yoruba wives and a few husbands flocked into the Native Courts to obtain divorces. This possibility accentuated the importance for women of having their own incomes: they could escape from abusive or incompatible marriages if they were capable of repaying the dowry given by their husbands and thenceforth supporting their households on their own. That was a realistic possibility for women who were already earning money, and they could return to their birth families if necessary. Divorce was far less attractive to Baganda women during the colonial years, for they rarely had experience in supporting themselves without a husband and would not be welcomed back by their natal relatives.

3. THE LATER TWENTIETH CENTURY IN UGANDA

Uganda suffered through an exceptionally difficult period during the government headed by Idi Amin and the second administration of Milton Obote, 1971-1985. Although the country had gained independence from Britain in 1962 and enjoyed a fairly stable initial decade, the military takeover by Amin initiated a period of enormous unrest and violence, with civil war, guerilla fighting, and attacks by uncontrolled soldiers. In the next 15 years, between 800,000
and 1,000,000 people, mainly men, are thought to have been killed (out of a total population of 10-12 million). Several million others were displaced from their homes: going into hiding, seeking refuge in other parts of Uganda, or leaving the country entirely. Many women found themselves the heads of their households, obliged to provide for themselves and their children without help from their husbands or other male relatives. Migration into towns increased somewhat, but even so, few Ugandans lived in larger communities: only 8% of the population was urban in 1970 and only 14% as late as 2000, much of it centered in and around Kampala.

For many Ugandans, the security of life improved when the army of the National Resistance Movement (NRM), led by Yoweri Museveni, took Kampala in 1986 and formed a new government. But during the NRM era, which extended to 2013 and probably beyond, instability continued in some parts of the county. Ongoing fighting in the north, directed often against civilians and sometimes involving the abduction of children, brought further loss of life. Refugee camps housed tens of thousands, especially women and children, who had been forced out of their rural homes.

HIV/AIDS posed a new challenge. Spread initially by soldiers during the early and mid-1980s, it was recognized as a national problem later in that decade. By 1992, about 16% of the Ugandan population was thought to be infected. Unlike many African governments, however, the NRM joined with religious and civic groups in mounting a public educational campaign to limit transmission of the virus and de-stigmatize the illness. By 2003, the rate of infection had been cut in half. But many people (mainly men) had already died, and an estimated 1.7 million children had been orphaned by HIV/AIDS, losing one or both parents. These pressures

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contributed to female-headed households, which in 1991 constituted 29% of all family units. Healthy women often acquired a cluster of dependents, including the orphaned children of other relatives. Village women might be able to feed their enlarged households by staying home and growing food, but because education was highly regarded, payment of school fees was a major contributor to women’s eagerness to earn some cash of their own. Yet since the birthrate was still very high (it had declined slightly to an average of 6.9 births per woman by 2000-1) and most children now survived, Uganda’s total population continued to grow. By the end of the century, it was estimated at 22.5 million, double its level in 1971, surpassing the ability of transport systems, water supplies, schools, and medical services to cope with the demand.17

The Ugandan economy remained heavily agricultural throughout the decades after Independence. Even at the end of the century, five-sixths of the population grew food for their own families plus—in most cases—a little extra for sale. Because land was relatively plentiful in most regions in comparison to the population, a given plot was cleared and cultivated for a few years and then allowed to go fallow for an extended period. Draft animals could rarely be used, and mechanized equipment was found on only a few of the largest farms. Apart from the handful of large towns, most shops and markets focused on agricultural produce and simple manufactured goods, often imported from India. Most traders were still South Asian men.

That pattern was shattered during the Amin period. The formal economy collapsed due to unwise government policies, accentuated by expulsion of 90,000 South Asians in 1972. The Asians, many of whose families had been in Uganda since long before Independence, had controlled the country’s distributive system. When their businesses—ranging from local shops to large industrial conglomerates—were confiscated by the government and turned over to inexperienced Ugandan owners, often military men, the companies usually failed. An acute

17 Ibid.
shortage of even basic consumer goods like soap and salt contributed to massive inflation. Many items could be purchased only on the black market, though upper-level people in the government or army fared better. Wages were at best stagnant, and the largest employer—the government—frequently delayed its payments or skipped them entirely. Although some local trading was now done by barter, and women devised clever ways of making substitutes for soap and salt out of local plants, household heads had to find ways of bringing in at least a little cash for essential items and ideally to educate their children.

The public economy gradually became functional again after 1986. Production and distribution of agricultural products and manufactured goods improved, and inflation was slowly controlled. The NRM introduced Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) to bring its economic and social policies into line with the demands of international organizations like the World Bank and International Monetary Fund. Whereas the standard of living for most people of middling and higher ranks eventually rose, the Structural Adjustment Programs worsened conditions for the poor, especially women, as was true in much of sub-Saharan Africa. Further, the government promoted engagement in the emerging globalized economy, in which Uganda fills the same roles that Yorubaland had previously done: producing agricultural products (e.g., in this case, cut flowers for European markets) while consuming manufactured items. People with ample resources or access to abundant credit could now compete in proposing large entrepreneurial projects such as those favored by the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) introduced by the USA in 2000. Early in the twenty-first century, oil reserves were discovered in several parts of western Uganda, opening up the possibility of new economic growth but also intensifying corruption. Having defined the background, we will now focus on women’s changing economic activities within these largely dissimilar contexts.
C. WOMEN IN THE PUBLIC ECONOMY

1. AMONG THE YORUBA

In Yorubaland, women were active participants in the market economy throughout the years between 1820 and 1960. Nearly all women had income generating activities of their own, for Yoruba society accepted that husbands might not be able to provide full support for their wives and children and that women’s contributions were vital to the public economy. Whatever women earned was theirs to use as they wished, not given to their husband or pooled in a shared household fund. The first charge upon their income was providing necessities for themselves and their children, but additional profits could be contributed to religious rituals or important events in their families, social organizations, or community. As formal education developed, many women paid for the schooling of their children. Wealthy wives might take on civic responsibilities and ideally be granted a chief’s title; widows occasionally built up large households filled with their own dependents.

In the nineteenth century, these patterns were intensified by demographic problems, mounting urbanization, expanded commerce, and increased polygyny. Violence intensified the pattern whereby groups of men went out into the fields to do agricultural work, while women remained in the towns and traded. Middle-distance and long-distance commerce increased, creating new opportunities for women as wholesalers, while an expansion of polygyny meant that men were even less able to furnish food and clothing for all their wives and children. When many men were temporarily or permanently absent from a household and community, as was
common in western Yorubaland at certain times within the nineteenth century, women’s labor and skills became essential for the maintenance of their relatives and society. In these unsettled circumstances, “push” factors were often paramount. Some women carried agricultural produce from their own family’s fields or from nearby farmers to the market for sale. Others processed raw foodstuffs into the forms desired by consumers, made and sold craft items, or traded manufactured goods they had not produced themselves.

The period between around 1840 and 1880 was particularly favorable for Yoruba women in commerce. Because they had traditionally produced oil and other palm items for domestic use, they moved readily into trade with the Atlantic ports. Most women remained at lower or middle economic levels, making palm oil, preparing palm kernels, and carrying their own items (and sometimes those of other people) to markets, either on their heads or by hiring a canoe. But the lack of gender definitions concerning unfamiliar import/export items offered wider opportunities for some women. The wealthiest handled slaves, guns, ammunition, and ivory as well as palm products. The most powerful of these women, like Madam Tinubu in Lagos and Abeokuta and Efusetan Aniwura in Ibadan, were in a position to use their resources to assist in warfare and influence political decisions on the part of local rulers and British officials. Other women expanded their craftwork, particularly weaving, dyeing, and pottery, which they sold not only for local consumption but also for export to other West African countries and slave economies in the Western Hemisphere. In the nineteenth century, however—as in the twentieth—most Yoruba women earned money in order to fill their roles as wives and mothers more effectively, not to gain greater individual independence. Only under atypical circumstances did widows or childless women like Madam Tinubu and Efunsetan try to gain exceptional wealth and power for themselves, illustrating one kind of “pull” factors.
Yoruba women’s ability to enter into the public economy during the pre-colonial period was supported by their culture’s attitudes toward gender and women’s essential roles in public life. Although scholars have argued vigorously about the nature and extent of gender definitions and patriarchy in nineteenth-century Yorubaland, most would agree that gender was not a primary definitional category, nor was there any emphasis on gender per se.18 Men did not warrant automatic respect or deference simply because they were male, nor were women considered inherently weaker or inferior to men. Both sexes could gain status in many ways: through their age or seniority with an extended family, their personal wealth or wisdom, and their public roles. After marriage, women remained part of their natal family and lineage as well as of their husbands’, able to claim assistance and occasionally land from their own kin group and to receive chiefly titles specific to it. Even the supreme being, Oduduwa, and many of the lesser deities did not have clearly defined genders, allowing men and women alike to venerate and identify with them.

Gender roles were shaped by the Yoruba belief that both women and men had to participate in all activities in order to attain the balance necessary for harmony in human society and the natural world. Labor was not rigidly gendered. Agricultural work was shared between men and women, and both sexes did craftwork. While women were particularly active in trade, some men took part too. Certain practical roles were, however, differentiated. Women were responsible for raising young children and processing and cooking food for their husbands and other members of the household. Men were expected to maintain the buildings in the family’s

compound (or in urban settings, pay the rent), provide physical protection for their households, and participate in warfare or raiding expeditions when required by their leaders.

Women’s participation in the extra-domestic economy was buttressed by their essential roles in many social, cultural, and political practices. They had a long tradition of forming associations, called egbe, for mutual economic and social support, based on age, neighborhood, place of origin, religion, or occupation. These organizations elected officers, collected dues, and often went to public events as a group, dressed in similar apparel. Associations of female traders or special chiefs set prices in the marketplaces and resolved disputes. Women were necessary to Yoruba religion—serving as priestesses in the cults that worshipped the deities—and to certain forms of cultural transmission, such as chanting praise poems and delivering criticism to kings. Within some of the monarchies that succeeded the Oyo Empire, the mother and wives of the king held economic, political, and ceremonial power, and female regents might govern a kingdom for months or even years between the death of one ruler and the accession of the next. These activities reinforced cultural acceptance of women’s economic participation. A wife’s desire to earn her own money was enhanced by the expectation that she would contribute independently from her husband to religious rituals, her egbe, and community functions. A priestess essential to religious practice, serving as an intermediary between humans and the deities, or a woman who ruled her kingdom could surely not be expected to stay at home as a wife and mother, playing no role in the extra-domestic economy.

Yet while some older women and female chiefs had considerable independent authority, men generally made major decisions within the family, extended kin group, and community, after consultation with its leading female members. A qualified form of male dominance could thus coexist in practice with an ideological system that did not emphasize gender or assign a
lower status to women. Further, women’s ability to gain substantial economic profits in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was curtailed by some gendered handicaps. The
obstacles could be surmounted by intelligent and determined women, but they served to confine
most to lower economic strata. Yoruba women were expected to ensure that all their domestic
work was carried out (either in person or by finding another woman to fill their place), regardless
of whatever income generating activities they might be pursuing. They were disadvantaged with
respect to traveling, for it was often hard for women to leave home for extended periods,
especially if they had young children. (Both of these problems were less acute in polygynous
households, for the junior co-wives of a woman engaged in trade could look after the compound,
husband, and children in her absence.) Women were more vulnerable than men to assault,
capture, or theft of their goods, and they found it more difficult to control or own landed
property, as family land was normally distributed primarily to men. Because labor had to be
provided either from within the household—by family members or slaves—or by the followers
and dependents of powerful people, and because women were less likely to head their own
compounds, they faced special challenges in accessing and deploying the labor that provided the
productive capacity needed to accumulate wealth. They had more trouble gaining credit, for
moneylenders and trading companies commonly asked for land or slaves as collateral. Women’s
ability to display wealth and power through the normal cultural markers was impaired. Powerful
men made their position known in part by building up large compounds and using their resources
and influence on behalf of others, sometimes drawing upon supernatural powers to do so.
Especially in periods when women were gaining unfamiliar levels of economic and personal
independence, if they tried to employ similar signifiers of their status, they might be accused of
improper behavior or witchcraft.
During the second half of the nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth, Christian missionaries, foreign merchants, and colonial officials introduced their own patriarchal attitudes and policies into southwestern Nigeria. British Victorian middle-class beliefs held that women were weaker than men, both physically and emotionally, and that they should remain within the home, leaving the role of breadwinner to their fathers or husbands. When the British attempted to impose these gender roles within Yorubaland, they were met with dismay, for they conflicted with the lack of fixed gender definition and the widespread participation of Yoruba women in the public economy and community. Although local people commonly ignored new expectations that conflicted with their own values, and the most confining of British assumptions were loosened from the 1930s onward, foreign attitudes had already been built into many colonial practices. Unfamiliar gender expectations thus intensified the challenges women now faced in trying to compete in the larger and more complex system of international capitalist trade.

During the colonial period, many women continued to work in familiar ways, due in part to the ongoing urbanization of their region. The methods whereby export goods were collected within the countryside and smaller towns for transport to the Atlantic ports and the system whereby imported items were distributed remained favorable to women’s local and regional engagement. They still predominated among sellers in markets of all sizes, on the streets, and from their own homes, and their elected officers controlled most marketplaces. They frequently operated as middlemen within a given area of Yorubaland, though they were less likely to buy and sell over longer distances. But the colonial government’s economic programs discriminated against women. The training programs set up for farmers and the loan schemes for new businesses assumed that the participants would be men; the Marketing Boards that dealt with
palm kernels and cocoa rarely appointed female buyers. The growing absorption of Yorubaland into a wider economic system likewise disadvantaged women. When foreign trading companies named local representatives, they were far less likely to name women than men. Female weavers and dyers gradually lost ground to cheap, mass-produced cloth imported from Britain.

Whereas trading and craftwork had roots in the nineteenth century, other Yoruba women entered some new occupations made possible by the colonial system. These activities stemmed from the willingness of parents to invest in the formal schooling of their daughters, at boarding institutions in Nigeria or even in Britain. Christian missionaries had quickly set up schools for girls, schools that emphasized Western-style domestic arts like fancy sewing and cooking; their students were supposed to use these skills later as wives and mothers within the home. Even the high-status boarding schools for girls from leading families stressed domestic training. But many Yoruba women were unwilling to accept the missionaries’ expectation that as wives and mothers they would stay at home, giving up their own businesses and becoming economically dependent upon their husbands. Instead they used their training to create new opportunities for themselves, based upon their assumption that of course they would have their own incomes and their desire for independence in their working lives. Some girls who had learned cooking and sewing in missionary or government schools converted those skills into money-making activities, earning a good living by setting up restaurants, hotels, and seamstress establishments or by opening private domestic arts institutes. Others became teachers and nurses, usually working at first in church- or government-run schools or hospitals but often moving on to found their own schools or clinics; such businesses offered larger incomes, freedom from supervision by tiresome and often arrogant whites, and more flexibility during pregnancy and while taking care of children. By the 1930s, young women in the towns were starting to use their literacy and
numeracy to find employment in shops or offices. After 1945 a few women acquired the advanced education needed to move into the higher professions or the colonial Civil Service, despite government reservations about their competency and commitment to their work.

Women maintained some authority in religious terms as well. Traditional beliefs held their power in certain Yoruba regions right through the colonial period, and within them, women remained essential as priestesses. In many Christian and Muslim congregations, although women were excluded from holding spiritual offices, they formed egbe that participated in social and economic decisions. Some of the enormously popular independent or syncretic Christian churches allowed women to preach and head their own congregations.

If Yoruba women during the colonial years had been asked why they took part in the extra-domestic economy rather than simply growing food for their families, most would probably have responded that they did so to provide a more comfortable life for their household and a better future for their children. But some women also valued other “pull” factors: the economic independence they gained through their work, the sociability offered by activity outside their own home, and the opportunity to use their skills on behalf of the community.¹⁹ Those goals mirrored the benefits of participation in other public realms.

Before leaving Yoruba women, we may look quickly at their market engagement and participation in public life during the later twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. The majority of women still had their own incomes, often stemming from commerce. Nearly all market sellers in 2011 were women, and they remained active at middling and sometimes upper levels of the trading economy too. Other women used private real estate to generate profit or ran industrial operations, sometimes becoming extremely wealthy. Those activities were supported

by further urbanization. As early as 1963, 38% of the Yoruba population lived in urban settings, and by 2002, twenty Yoruba cities had populations of 100,000 or more, with many others above 50,000. Thanks to the ongoing expansion of female higher education, women were active also in the professions and Civil Service. They participated in family decisions and their own organizations, including those based on religion. Women chiefs were highly regarded, and some kingdoms still had female regents. Because Yoruba women contributed so vigorously to the economy and other public areas, they received considerable attention from Western historians and feminists writing during the 1970s and 1980s, eager to identify “liberated” women around the globe.\textsuperscript{20}

Yoruba women themselves, however, noted that they continued to face constraints in the post-colonial world. They were rarely in a position to help formulate economic or other policies, for they were severely under-represented at all levels of government even in 2013. Despite the treasure flowing into certain Nigerian pockets thanks to oil production, the standard of living of many women (like many men) remained very low. Local market sellers, for example, commonly earned little more than they needed to meet their family’s expenses that day. As had been true in earlier periods, women who did accumulate wealth and used it to achieve influence in other

spheres might be at risk. They were sometimes described as “male” women or suspected of using witchcraft to achieve their prosperity.21

2. AMONG THE BAGANDA

Baganda women’s economic lives took place within a quite different cultural world during the nineteenth century and colonial era. The 99% who were neither members of royal or chiefs’ families nor wielders of spiritual power lived in households headed by a man, first their father, then their husband, and if they were widowed, their deceased husband’s relatives. Because they were not regarded as legal adults, they could not hold family land and had to be represented by a male relative within public contexts. After marriage, they had relatively little contact with their natal families and no inheritance rights within them. Husbands were expected to consult with their wives when making major decisions, and several female members of the royal family served as advisors to the king, but men were not obligated to accept the wishes or suggestions of these women.

Baganda gender definitions assumed that women were subordinate to men, and productive tasks were sharply divided by type of work and sex. Most agricultural work was assigned to women. If land was to be reclaimed from the bush in preparation for planting, the initial clearing was typically done by men, but even in the late twentieth century women provided about 85% of the labor in planting, weeding, and harvesting food staples, including root crops, bananas, and the vegetables used in sauces. For such work they used hoes and panga knives. Women also did all the domestic tasks: preparing and cooking food, carrying home

water and gathering fuel (which could take as much as 4 hours/day in some areas), cleaning the house and compound, and attending to the needs of other people in their family. They also wove mats and baskets out of reeds and sometimes made simple clay pots, largely for their own family’s use. Men were responsible for the physical repair and protection of the house, provided meat from hunting and fish from the lakes, and brewed beer, essential for social and ceremonial occasions. Because women did most of the routine work, men were able to fill their obligations to the king and chiefs, including helping to build new structures, maintain roads, or make bark cloth. They were also allowed more time for sociability and community affairs than were women. In village settings this general pattern continued throughout the twentieth century.

Prior to the colonial period, most Baganda women took little part in wider economic or community affairs. Interacting with men outside their immediate family was discouraged. They did not buy or sell in the markets in person, though they might grow extra food or make some craft items that their husbands would sell or barter for a hoe or salt. Women had no other means of generating their own income. Within the clans, women were commonly responsible for maintaining the group’s burial ground, but they are not mentioned as having other spiritual or social duties. Nor were they involved in such decisions as allocating clan land to individual families. We need to be aware, however, that the Baganda—both men and women—were and still are known for their dislike of overt aggression and conflict. They often prefer to adopt a modest public stance while using persuasion, passive resistance, or other forms of manipulation behind the scenes to achieve favorable outcomes. What is noted in historical or ethnographical accounts may therefore be only the external appearance: some women probably had more say within their own households than such statements suggest.
A few exceptional women held greater authority, which some scholars have suggested was a vestige of the more prominent position enjoyed by women in Baganda society during earlier centuries. Prior to the mid-nineteenth century, female members of Buganda’s extended royal family—especially the queen mother, the king’s official sister, and some of the princesses—had had their own estates and ran courts for their own dependents. They served as conduits between the king and the clan from which his mother came, and they had certain ceremonial duties.22 The queen mother, for example, originally wielded independent authority, which she was supposed to use to limit the excesses of the king and protect the nation. But the wealth and power of the queen mother and other royal women were weakened by the economic, political, and military changes of the nineteenth century, even before the establishment of British rule. The leading women within important chieftaincy families likewise had some ability to control the activity of those men and women who were dependents of their houses. During the earlier part of the nineteenth century, priestesses, prophetesses, and female healers exercised spiritual and medicinal authority, part of a pattern present in the Great Lakes region for hundreds of years.23 Many of the kingdoms, including Buganda, incorporated the power of such women into court rituals. But here too, the position of such women was already diminishing by the time the new religions arrived, and Christianity and Islam tried to eliminate any surviving remnants.

During the colonial years, very few Baganda women worked outside the domestic context. The great majority devoted most or all of their labor to producing food for their own families. Those who lived near the limited number of towns sometimes grew additional food for


sale, but their husbands generally took it to market or it was handled by Indian traders who came to their homes. Even in Kampala as late as 1955, only 9 percent of the 140 sellers in one of the main markets were women, and they all offered vegetables or fruit, not the more profitable meat, fish, or manufactured goods.24 By the late colonial period, some urban women were beginning to make and sell cooked food and alcoholic beverages, on the street or from their homes.

Secretarial work was normally done by European women at upper levels and by South Asian men at lower levels. Opportunities for educated women as salaried workers—including teachers, nurses, and community development workers—were scant. In 1952 only 3,000-4,000 women were employed for wages of any kind throughout the whole country, constituting 1-2 percent of such workers. The domestic servants hired by whites or prosperous South Asians were almost entirely male. Sex work or being kept by a man, practices severely opposed by government officials and local custom, were pursued by only a few urban women.

The minimal participation of Baganda women in the public economy stemmed not only from the county’s weakly developed commercial system and limited urbanization but also from powerful attitudes regarding women and their proper roles. The strongly patriarchal beliefs of the Baganda in the nineteenth century were reinforced when British colonial administrators introduced their own gender values early in the twentieth century. The similarity between those two sets of attitudes led to the emergence of what Grace Bantebya and I have labeled “a model of Domestic Virtue.”25 This unwritten code grew out of male worry about the possibility of increased freedom for women in marriage and as holders of private land, new kinds of autonomy made possible by British colonial laws. In simplified form, it said that women were respected as wives and mothers so long as they remained within their own compound and fields, devoting

25 Bantebya and McIntosh, Women, Work, and Domestic Virtue, esp. 79-83 and 263-6.
their attention to their own homes, grew sufficient food for their families, and allowed decisions
to be made by men. Women who were away from home were suspected of being uncontrolled or
sexually available. For many women, especially uneducated rural ones, these expectations
remained a limiting force right through the twentieth century and into the twenty-first.

But at the same time, some aspects of the domestic virtue model were undercut by British
missionaries, especially the married and unmarried “lady missionaries” who came to Uganda in
increasing numbers after around 1920. Although their girls’ schools, like those in Yorubaland,
placed a heavy emphasis on western domestic skills, they also encouraged some of the royal and
chiefs’ daughters who attended them to train as teachers or nurses. Further, by showing through
words and example that respectable women could continue working after marriage and
motherhood, they challenged the idea that women’s functions must be confined to the family.
The Baganda women who became the early teachers or nurses acquired additional cachet
through their employment in new, British-linked institutions: the schools and hospitals run by
missionaries and later the colonial government. Holly Hanson has suggested that the prominence
of aristocratic women in these roles under the colonial system may have constituted a
continuation of the greater independence they had previously enjoyed, thereby enabling them to
escape from the constraints of the domestic virtue model.26

The limited participation of Baganda women in the extra-domestic economy of the
colonial period was paralleled by their exclusion from most other aspects of the public life of
their communities. The religious roles played by some women prior to the introduction of Islam
and Christianity had disappeared, and women did not hold leadership positions in the new
congregations. They did not sit in either indigenous or colonial governmental bodies, and they

26 Hanson, review of Bantebya and McIntosh, Women, Work and Domestic Virtue, in American Historical
had no history of forming their own organizations. By the 1930s, however, Protestant and Catholic female missionaries were starting to set up women’s associations within their churches: the Mothers’ Union and the Women’s Guild. Although these groups mainly taught domestic skills, they also helped Baganda women learn how to function in groups. In so doing, they provided training that would prove of great value to post-colonial women leaders. Further, some women from important families retained individual social authority even if they did not hold official positions.

During the first decade after Ugandan Independence in 1962, women’s economic opportunities began to expand. Although most market sellers were still male, with intermediate and long-distance trade generally handled by Indians, women vendors were becoming more common in the markets of the handful of towns with 10,000 or more residents. In 1964, for example, 41% of the sellers in Kampala’s markets were female.27 Government rhetoric encouraged women to participate in many aspects of the country’s public life. National women’s organizations that spanned religions and ethnicities began to form, backed by community development efforts. Primary education for girls increased, though few went on to secondary education and female enrollment in the country’s only university was low.28 But earlier assumptions about women’s proper roles were rarely challenged, nor did the government’s support extend to female involvement in politics. The legal status of women was weak, providing scant protection against domestic violence and restricting their ability to inherit land.

28 In 1967 and 1968, 73-76 women students were admitted to Makerere University; by 1969-70, 22 percent of the 1,484 Ugandans enrolled at Makerere were women, but they were less likely to graduate, were heavily concentrated in the liberal arts subjects, not in professional fields, and were not represented in the university’s powerful student government.
from their fathers or husbands. If a married woman earned some money, she was expected to give it to her husband.

Not until the deeply disrupted period under Idi Amin and the second government of Milton Obote, 1971-1986, did Ugandan women begin to move into the public economy more fully. They did so then out of sheer necessity: because their husbands were dead or missing, or because they could no longer feed or educate their children. Several million women became suddenly responsible for their families due to government-sponsored violence and civil war. In some cases their husbands or fathers had been killed or were away, while in others male household heads were no longer able to gain sufficient income for necessary expenditures due to the collapse of the formal economy and crippling inflation. While the practical pressures that pushed Baganda women into the public economy in the 1970s and early 1980s thus resembled those encountered by Yoruba women during unsettled periods in the nineteenth century, the opportunities open to them were far more limited. Because very few Baganda women had previously worked outside the home, they had no marketable skills and no experience in generating an income.

It is impossible to determine exactly what kinds of work they did, for not only were most women engaged in the informal economy, which is always poorly documented, many were involved in types of activity that were deemed illegal by the government (e.g., sex work or brewing and selling beer) and hence had to be concealed. Some women decided to stay in the countryside, where they could be sure of feeding their families and sell a little surplus produce. Many others, however, moved into towns in hopes of finding better opportunities. Legitimate work there was almost entirely confined to making and selling food on a very small scale. Some women sold from their own rooms, while others hawked their items on the streets; only the most
fortunate were able to rent a market stall. Women with some education might find secretarial or clerical work, stepping into positions formerly held by South Asian men. Many teachers and nurses were forced to earn additional money outside their jobs or leave their positions entirely when the government delayed or defaulted on paying their salaries. Most of the women who sought work during the Amin/Obote years hoped simply to keep themselves and their families alive, not to better their own personal standing.

Further, unlike the Yoruba, the work of Baganda women brought them little if any respect. To the contrary, their unfamiliar presence and their economic and social autonomy alarmed some men. Amin and the government-controlled press launched a vicious campaign against all women who worked outside their homes, supported by a distorted version of the Domestic Virtue model that stressed their dangerous sexuality. Presidential decrees, enforced by the army, banned the use of makeup and wearing short skirts or other revealing clothing. Women were prohibited from walking along Kampala’s streets unless escorted by their husbands; any woman on her own could be arrested as a prostitute. Even women who were traveling legitimately in connection with their businesses were commonly treated as sexually available. Gender-based violence was acute, accentuated by the vulnerability of women who lived in isolated rural homesteads. The government shut down all women’s groups except those with narrowly defined religious functions. Amin outlawed political parties too, and when they emerged again under Obote, they paid little attention to women and their issues. When working women were asked in 2003 about their personal histories, almost all of them pointed to the Amin/Obote years as by far the most difficult time they had faced. State-supported attacks on women compounded the practical difficulties of trying to earn money in a physically dangerous
and economically unsettled environment, but they failed to prevent desperate women from doing whatever was needed to provide for their families.

Beginning in 1986, after Yoweri Museveni and the NRM formed a government, conditions for women changed. While some people presumably continued to think privately that women should confine their activities to the home, the NRM’s public rhetoric stressed their full involvement in all aspect of community and national life. With this encouragement, an active women’s movement developed, and the press reported on and invited discussion of many aspects of women’s lives. Individual women and their organizations were active players in the constitution-building process of the early 1990s, and the NRM implemented a series of affirmative action policies for women. Seats were reserved for them at all levels of government, from village councils through Parliament, in addition to any positions won through open competition, and President Museveni named a number of women to important posts, including the Vice President of the country and several Ministers of State. The government moved also to improve educational opportunities for girls and young women. The introduction of Universal Primary Education in 1997 eliminated tuition fees in primary schools and required parents to send children of both sexes to school. As intended, this resulted in a greater increase in enrolment by girls than boys; more girls now continued into secondary school. Concerned that less than a quarter of university students were female, the government introduced a system whereby women applicants were given additional points: by 2002, 41% of the students at Makerere University were female.²⁹ No attempt was made, however, to provide affirmative action measures for women in economic terms.

A combination of poverty as intensified by SAPs plus new opportunities in the expanding economy pushed or pulled women of all ranks into income producing activities. Most women

were still confined to low-profit, low-status work, such as selling in a market or running a small eatery, but their contributions to the economy were now at least partially acknowledged. Some women used their training as teachers or nurses to set up their own private schools or clinics, while others had sufficient capital to operate mid-sized shops or businesses such as travel agencies. Thanks to improved education for girls and university students, more women were going into the professions, while emerging fields like the media and entertainment offered employment to others. A tiny but highly visible group of businesswomen, often benefiting from the valuable connections offered by their husbands (important men in finance or the government) were able to access the credit needed to succeed at the highest level. They undertook large commercial projects within the country, such as developing property within Kampala, or entered international trade. These educated, confident, and in some cases highly successful women offered an alternative paradigm of a good woman, one capable of displacing the earlier domestically focused model.

Ugandan women who participated at intermediate and higher levels of the economy in the late twentieth century were usually working for “betterment” reasons. They hoped not only to provide a comfortable life for their households but also to educate their children through the university level and take advantage of the opportunities now available for service to the community and personal advancement. Some were becoming the “big man” of their extended family, offering advice and financial support to relatives. Ugandan women and foreign observers alike felt that the later 1980s and 1990s were a remarkable time for the country’s women.30

30 E.g., the essays in Holger B. Hansen and Michael Twaddle, eds., Developing Uganda (Oxford: James Currey, 1998); those in A. M. Tripp and J. C. Kwasiga, eds., The Women’s Movement in Uganda (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 2002); Miria Matembe, Gender, Politics, and Constitution Making in Uganda (Kampala: Fountain
Yet the majority of Ugandan working women were still stuck at the bottom of the range, selling food or drink on urban streets or in markets, despite active efforts by non-governmental organizations, microfinance projects, and community-based organizations to promote economic development among the poor. At the end of the century only 16% of women’s businesses had capital of US $132 or more. As Uganda moved more fully into the new global economy, few women had the financial resources and personal backing to bid for the large-scale contracts now being offered by the government or for entrepreneurial projects like those favored by AGOA. Further, the affirmative action policies promoted by the NRM government were being questioned. Male backlash was mounting against what were perceived as the unfair privileges given to women, and their guaranteed places in governmental bodies and the additional points they received in university applications were under attack. A meeting of Uganda’s women leaders in 2003 noted that traditional gender expectations remained powerful, limiting the ability of rural women to take advantage of new opportunities and forcing even educated urban women to conform to traditional patterns of female deference and domestic responsibility that reduced their ability to work on an equal basis with men. Gender tension was high, expressed in many cases as domestic violence. Abuse was found especially in settings where wives earned their own incomes, thereby gaining a degree of independence resented by their husbands.

By the turn of the century, the government’s commitment to women was lessening, as witnessed by its failure in 2002 to support either a Domestic Relations Bill that defined and banned domestic violence or a Land Act that would have increased widows’ inheritance rights. Some of the top women in government were eased out in 2003 and 2004. After a modified Domestic Relations Bill was tabled by Parliament in 2009, the female Minister of Gender and

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Publishers, 2002); and International Labour Organization, “Employment Promotion of Women in Uganda: From Disabling to Enabling Environment” (typed report, no date but mid-1990s).
Culture delivered a scathing attack on civil society organizations for their support of the measure; in a painful echo of the Amin era, she recommended that those groups should instead devote their efforts to ending “skimpy dressing” by women.\(^{31}\) A version of the Land Act was passed that year, but it no longer provided protection for widows. It is impossible to say at this time whether a negative confluence of global market pressures and gender constraints will continue to limit the economic participation of most Ugandan women to minimally profitable kinds of engagement. Or will improvements in female education, organizational capacity, and the presence of some women in the professions and upper levels of the economy serve to resist those forces, creating more positive models for good womanhood and opening up wider opportunities for working women in the decades ahead?

D. CONCLUDING SUGGESTIONS

Juxtaposing Yoruba and Baganda women’s working histories has highlighted the interplay between the context within which they functioned, their motives for entering the extra-domestic economy, and their society’s valuation of their roles. These ethnic groups illustrate very different relationships between the three factors, demonstrating both continuities and marked changes over time. For women to work outside the home in any setting, a number of underlying requirements had to be met. Because most women dealt in food or drink, at least initially, a prerequisite for their trading was that they had to get supplies. If men engaged in agriculture, women potentially had time to buy and then sell foodstuffs. But if raising crops was considered women’s work exclusively, female traders needed either to grow the items

themselves that they took to market on a part-time basis, or the level of agricultural productivity had to be high enough that the labor of some women could be spared for selling rather than growing food. A primary cause of many women’s decision to enter public economy, rather than simply staying at home and raising food directly, was the need or desire for items they could not produce themselves. That in turn presupposes the existence of some form of trading system that allowed women to participate. Other factors promoted their involvement. Women were more likely to seek and find a place in the extra-domestic economy in settings marked by a high degree of urbanization. They were especially likely to be pushed into income generating activity in communities disrupted by physical violence, such as slaving or civil wars, that left them responsible for the support of their families.

Different pressures commonly helped to draw women into work outside the home. The availability of formal schooling for their children often contributed to their eagerness for an income. If they had themselves received a good education, they might be pulled into the public economy by a desire to use their skills and contribute to the wellbeing of their community as a whole. For women at all levels, work outside the home offered social benefits as well, the companionship and interest of interacting with a wider range of people, as opposed to simply working in the fields.

The cultural valuation placed upon women’s work played a powerful role, capable of exerting strong pressure in either a positive or a negative sense. If women were involved in many aspects of public life, it seemed natural for them to be economically active as well, whereas such work could be threatening within a culture that defined women’s contributions as situated solely within the domestic context. During the colonial and post-colonial eras, governments have taken a range of rhetorical stances and promoted diverse economic climates
for women. Yet official opposition to female economic participation is unlikely to prevent
women from working when other forces are strong. Conversely, more than simple rhetoric is
needed to help women rise above the bottom rungs of the market system. Improved educational
opportunities and government backing for female economic participation can help to overcome
the restraints created by deeply rooted gender assumptions, creating unfamiliar and more
lucrative niches, but they may not be sufficient to eradicate older attitudes completely.

This project has also shed light on some broader issues. It emphasizes that colonialism
assumed many localized forms. Although the British Empire became somewhat more coherent
in Africa after World War I, it still did not impose uniform expectations and pressures on its
subjects. Even within a given protectorate, British authorities did not speak with a single voice.
Given the significant contrasts between Yoruba and Baganda societies prior to the arrival of the
British, it is unsurprising that women’s lives continued to differ in so many respects during the
colonial years. One of the most interesting features of women’s interactions with British rule
was how they gained agency, or were kept from it, by their own culture’s response to change.
The Yoruba remained loyal to many of their own religious and cultural patterns, despite their
general acceptance of change. Recognition that societies had to accommodate to new patterns
facilitated development of synchretic responses, syntheses of old and new. Just as the
independent Christian churches offered a modified version of missionary teachings that fit better
with Yoruba social and gender beliefs, so did Yoruba women take advantage of western
education to develop career opportunities for themselves unlike those anticipated by their British
teachers. When Yoruba women shut down their cities to protest British economic policies, they
were likewise transferring their skill at working in groups into new arenas. The Buganda
kingdom, by contrast, was able to maintain during the colonial era many of the authority patterns
visible in the late nineteenth century. This continuity was assisted by the system of indirect rule, which solidified the recently expanded power of the king, chiefs, and their courts, and—by extension—of husbands over wives. Because Baganda women had no public persona in the eyes of either their own leaders or colonial authorities, and because they did not have effective organizations of their own, they had no means of demanding that attention be paid to the issues that concerned them. As power was concentrated in the hands of a small group of male authorities, both African and British, the familiar Baganda cultural mechanism of working behind the scenes was no longer sufficient to produce favorable outcomes. A comparative analysis of women’s work can thus be useful in its own right and offer a new perspective on more general questions in the history of imperialism.
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